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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW¾THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE 
LACK OF SIXTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR 
INDIGENT NATIVE AMERICAN DEFENDANTS IN TRIBAL 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954 (2016) 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In United States v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court held that 
tribal court convictions of uncounseled indigent defendants of domestic 
assault are sufficient to convict under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a), which is the 
federal offense of domestic assault in Indian country by a habitual offender.  
The Court found that because the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal 
court proceedings and Bryant’s convictions were valid under the Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 there are no constitutional issues present when 
relying on such convictions as predicate offenses for an 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) 
prosecution.  Bryant illustrates the striking differences that are still present 
in all levels of today’s judicial system, especially where indigent defendants 
are concerned.  Moreover, due to the multiple Federal Indian Reservations 
within the State, this case will likely impact North Dakota tribal law by 
reaffirming the lack of Sixth Amendment protections for indigent, Native 
American defendants in tribal court. 
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I. FACTS 
In June 2011, Michael Bryant, Jr., a Native American living on the 
Northern Cheyenne reservation, was indicted by a federal grand jury with 
two separate counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).1  Section 117(a) criminalizes “domestic assault 
within . . . Indian country” by anyone “who has a final conviction on at 
least two separate, prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court 
proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal 
jurisdiction[,] . . . assault . . . against a spouse or intimate partner.”2  This 
 
1.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (2016). 
2.  United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014). 
         
2016] CASE COMMENT 253 
law was developed to help combat serial domestic violence issues present in 
Indian country.3  Bryant was the type of serial defendant the law aimed to 
regulate, having pled guilty to domestic abuse on at least five occasions 
between 1997 and 2007.4  All of these convictions resulted in a term of 
imprisonment, but no single conviction exceeded one year.5  When 
prosecuting Bryant under 18 U.S.C. §117(a) for two domestic assaults in 
2011, the government relied on these prior, domestic assault convictions 
from the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court as predicate offenses.6  Bryant 
was indigent and unrepresented by counsel during these prior convictions.7  
This lack of counsel was due to the Law and Order Code of the Northern 
Cheyenne Tribe, Title 5, Chapter III, Rule 22, which allows a defendant in a 
criminal case to “defend himself . . . by . . . [an] attorney at his own 
expense” but the Tribe does not guarantee a right to appointed counsel in 
any case.8 
Bryant filed a motion to dismiss his indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 
117(a) and was represented by court appointed counsel.9  The motion to 
dismiss argued that using prior tribal court convictions to satisfy an element 
of 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) violated Bryant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 
for two reasons: (1) he was not appointed counsel during his tribal court 
proceedings and (2) only Native Americans could be prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 117(a) on the basis of a prior conviction that did not satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment.10  Both of these arguments were dismissed by the 
district court.11  Based on the dismissal, Bryant pled guilty, reserving his 
right to appeal, and was sentenced to forty-six months’ imprisonment.12 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Bryant’s 
conviction,13 finding that his uncounseled convictions in tribal court were 
valid when entered, because the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does 
not apply in tribal court proceedings.14  Relying on Ant,15 however, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the government could not use tribal court 
 
3.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958, 1963. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. at 1963. 
6.  Bryant, 769 F.3d. at 672-73. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Id. at 674 n.4. 
9.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1963-64. 
10.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1957. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 675. 
15.  United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1394-95 (1989). 
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convictions as predicate offenses for an 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) prosecution.16  
“Ant stands for the general proposition that even when tribal court 
proceedings comply with ICRA and tribal law, if the denial of counsel in 
that proceeding violates federal constitutional law, the resulting conviction 
may not be used to support a subsequent federal prosecution.”17  The Indian 
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”), establishes rights and freedoms of 
Native Americans in Indian country similar to those provided by the United 
States Constitution to non-Native Americans.18  The Constitution does not 
apply to Indian nations, because, at the time of ratification, these nations 
were acknowledged as sovereign, and thus, did not ratify the Constitution.19  
One aspect of ICRA is governance of criminal proceedings in tribal courts, 
requiring appointed counsel only when a sentence longer than one year of 
imprisonment is imposed.20 
In holding that the government could not use validly reached tribal-
court convictions as predicate offenses for 18 U.S.C. §117(a) prosecutions, 
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Bryant had not been afforded the same right 
to counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to defendants in state or 
federal court.21  Because Bryant had not been afforded the same right to 
counsel, the convictions would have been unconstitutional in state or 
federal courts.22  This decision created a split between the Ninth Circuit and 
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which had upheld similar indictments in 
United States v. Cavanaugh23 and United States v. Shavanaux.24 
In Cavanaugh, the Eighth Circuit reversed a District of North Dakota 
ruling based on facts that were nearly identical to Bryant.25  The defendant 
in Cavanaugh was a Native American man from the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe who was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §117(a) based on previous, 
uncounseled domestic assault convictions in tribal court.26  Likewise, in 
Shavanaux, the Tenth Circuit faced a nearly identical fact pattern in which a 
Native American man from the Ute Indian Tribe was charged with violating 
18 U.S.C. § 117(a) based on uncounseled domestic assault convictions in 
 
16.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. 
17.  Id. (quoting United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1008 n.9 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
18.  Indian Civil Rights Act, TRIBAL L. & POL’Y INST., http://www.tribal-institute.org/ 
lists/icra.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
19.  Id. 
20.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958-59. 
21.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 678. 
22.  Id. 
23.  United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011). 
24.  Unites States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011). 
25.  Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 592. 
26.  Id. at 594. 
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tribal court.27  In both Cavanaugh and Shavanaux, the district courts’ 
decisions were reversed, holding that tribal-court “convictions, valid at their 
inception, and not alleged to be otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove 
the elements of [18 U.S.C.] § 117.”28 
After the Ninth Circuit refused to rehear the case en banc, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve the federal circuits’ disagreement as to 
whether uncounseled tribal court convictions could be used to prosecute 
individuals under enhancement statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).29  The 
Court ultimately reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.30 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Approximately forty-six percent of Native American women have been 
victims of physical violence by an intimate partner, experiencing battery at 
three times the rate of Caucasian women, and sexual assault at nearly 
double the rate of the next highest group.31  Depending on the crime 
committed, Indian country may be governed by federal, state, or tribal law.  
For example, federal law, such as the Indian Major Crimes Act or the 
Indian Country Crimes Act may control; however, state law controls if the 
offense is not specifically included in federal legislation and the state has 
been given jurisdiction over Indian country.32  This “complex patchwork of 
federal, state, and tribal law”33 makes it difficult to prevent the persistent 
domestic violence experienced by Native American women.34  Not only 
does the interplay of three judicial systems create confusion over which 
jurisdiction will prosecute certain crimes, federal law also limits tribes’ 
abilities to enforce criminal sentences for violations of tribal laws.35  When 
18 U.S.C. § 117 was passed, the ICRA limited tribal courts to sentences of 
only one year.36  Now, tribal courts can enforce sentences of imprisonment 
of up to three years so long as the tribe adopts additional procedural 
requirements.37 
 
27.  Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 995. 
28.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1964 (quoting Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 594). 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. at 1959. 
32.  Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n. 1 (1990). 
33.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1959-60 (citing Duro 495 U.S. at 680 n. 1 (1990)). 
34.  Id. at 1960. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. 
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Exasperating the issue of domestic violence upon Native American 
women, many tribal courts are unable to prosecute non-Native Americans 
for crimes that occur on tribal lands without substantial restrictions.38  This 
lack of jurisdiction stems from the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe.39  In Oliphant, the Court held that tribal 
courts “do not have inherent criminal jurisdiction to try and punish non-
Indians, and hence may not assume such jurisdiction unless specifically 
authorized to do so by Congress.”40  While Congress did pass legislation in 
2013, to give tribal courts jurisdiction over certain domestic violence 
offenses committed by non-Indians, this limited jurisdiction requires each 
tribe to implement even more procedures.41  One such requirement is 
providing appointed counsel for non-Native American, indigent 
defendants.42  Few tribes, however, have implemented these procedures.43 
In response to the alarmingly high rates of domestic violence among 
Native American women, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).44  Section 
117(a)(1) makes it a federal crime for any person “who has a final 
conviction on at least [two] separate prior occasions in Federal, State, or 
Indian tribal court proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to 
Federal jurisdiction[,] . . .assault . . . against a spouse or intimate partner” to 
commit a “domestic assault within . . . Indian country.”45  Having at least 
two previous convictions for domestic violence crimes is a predicate for 18 
U.S.C. § 117(a) because it is intended to provide felony-level punishment 
for serial domestic violence offenders.46  The passage of this statute was the 
first true effort to remove repeat offenders “from the communities that they 
repeatedly terrorize.”47  This Section, however, has also raised the question 
of whether 18 U.S.C. § 117(a)’s inclusion of previous, uncounseled, tribal 
court convictions as predicate offenses is compatible with the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel, as highlighted in United States v. Bryant.48 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants appointed 
counsel in any state or federal criminal proceedings in which a term of 
 
38.  Id. at 1960 n. 1, n. 4 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978)). 
39.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 195. 
40.  Id. at 191. 
41.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960 n.4. 
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2016); Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1958. 
45.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673. 
46.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961. 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. at 1959. 
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imprisonment is imposed.49  However, the Court has consistently found that 
neither this Sixth Amendment protection, nor the Constitution as a whole, 
apply to tribal court proceedings.50  This lack of constitutional protections 
in tribal court is due to tribes being “separate sovereigns pre-existing the 
Constitution.”51  Because the Constitution was framed to place limitations 
on federal and state authority, the Supreme Court has found that these 
constitutional constraints do not apply to tribal courts.52  Instead, rights 
provided to Native American defendants in tribal court are governed by the 
ICRA.53 
Congress designed the ICRA to extend to tribal governments certain 
rights and liberties guaranteed by the United States Constitution.54  The 
ICRA imposes limits on tribal self-governance through procedural and 
safeguard requirements for tribal court proceedings.55  These procedures 
and safeguards are “similar, but not identical, to those contained in the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.”56  An example of such a 
safeguard is the limitation placed on a defendant’s right to counsel in tribal 
court.57  If a tribal court imposes a sentence longer than one year, the ICRA 
requires the court to provide the defendant counsel “ . . . at least equal to 
that guaranteed by the United States Constitution. . . .”58  However, if the 
sentence is one year or less, the tribal court must give the “ . . . defendant 
only the opportunity to obtain counsel ‘at his own expense.’”59  As such, 
unlike indigent defendants in federal or state court, indigent Native 
American defendants face up to one year of imprisonment without the right 
to appointed counsel.60  While the ICRA was designed to “ . . . fit the 
unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal governments[,]”61 
the result has been that “[t]he right to counsel under ICRA is not 
 
49.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). 
50.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 675 (citing United States v. First, 731 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Percy, 250 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 2001); Tom v. Sutton, 533 F.2d 1101, 
1102-03 (9th Cir. 1976); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978); Talton v. 
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896)). 
51.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962 (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56). 
52.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 675 n.5 (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56). 
53.  Id. 
54.  Steve Russell, Indian Civil Rights Act (1968), THE GALE GROUP INC. (2004), 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/united-states-and-canada/north-american-indigenous-
peoples/indian-civil-rights-act-1968#3407400162. 
55.  Bryant, 769 F.3d at 675 n.5. 
56.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962 (quoting Martinez, 436 U.S. at 57). 
57.  Id. 
58.  Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c)(1)-(2) (2016)). 
59.  Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2016)). 
60.  Id. at 1962. 
61.  Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63. 
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coextensive with the Sixth Amendment right” present in state and federal 
courts.62 
III. ANALYSIS 
In United States v. Bryant, with Justice Ginsburg writing for the 
majority, the Supreme Court explained that the Sixth Amendment does not 
apply in tribal court proceedings and that valid convictions under the ICRA 
retain their validity in subsequent prosecutions.63  Justice Thomas 
concurred with the judgment, but he felt the need to write separately to 
express his concern over the extent to which precedent has extended 
Congress’ control over tribes.64  Both the majority and concurrence agreed 
that Court precedent in Burgett v. Texas,65 and Nichols v. United States,66 
allows for uncounseled, tribal court convictions to be used as predicate 
offenses in a federal prosecution.67 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION 
The majority opinion in United States v. Bryant, relied heavily on 
Burgett and Nichols to find that previous, uncounseled, tribal court 
convictions could be used as predicate offenses for prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. §117(a).68  While Bryant argued that tribal court convictions should 
be treated as though they had been entered by a federal or state court for 
purposes of 18 U.S.C. §117(a), the Supreme Court declined to do so.69 
1. Explaining Precedent: Burgett and Nichols 
A state or federal court conviction that violates a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights cannot be used in a later proceeding to support guilt or 
to enhance the punishment given for a separate offense.70  Using such a 
“constitutionally infirm conviction . . . would cause ‘the accused in effect 
[to] suffe[r] anew from the [prior] deprivation of [his] Sixth Amendment 
right.’”71  This rationale, however, was limited by the Supreme Court in 
Nichols which stated, “an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid 
 
62.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962. 
63.  Id. at 1958. 
64.  Id. at 1967. 
65.  Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). 
66.  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
67.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962-63, 1967. 
68.  Id. at 1965-66. 
69.  Id. at 1965. 
70.  Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115. 
71.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962 (citations omitted). 
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under Scott72 because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used 
to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.”73  In Nichols, an 
uncounseled conviction resulting in a fine was found to be validly used 
under the Sixth Amendment to invoke a subsequent conviction.74 
The Supreme Court reasoned that “‘[e]nhancement statutes, . . . do not 
change the penalty imposed for the earlier conviction[,]’” instead, 
penalizing only the latest offense committed by the defendant.75  As stated 
in United States v. Rodriquez, “100% of the punishment is for the offense of 
conviction.  None is for the prior convictions or the defendant’s status as a 
recidivist.”76  Bryant followed Nichols precedent, finding that convictions 
that were valid when entered retain their constitutional status when used in 
later proceedings.77 
2. The Sixth Amendment Does Not Apply to Tribal Courts 
Bryant did not argue that his tribal court convictions were invalid when 
entered.78  Instead, Bryant challenged the Nichols precedent which held that 
these uncounseled, tribal court convictions retained their validity when used 
as part of a 18 U.S.C §117(a) prosecution.79  The Supreme Court stated that 
“[i]t is undisputed that a conviction obtained in violation of a defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in a subsequent 
proceeding.”80  However, as previously discussed, the United States 
Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply to tribal courts.81  While the 
Court discussed the rationale of not allowing the use of convictions that 
violated the Sixth Amendment, it emphasized that both Burgett and Nichols 
had occurred in either state or federal court.82 
Because Bryant’s previous convictions for domestic assault had 
occurred in tribal court, the Sixth Amendment did not apply.83  This meant 
that under the ICRA, Bryant was not denied the right to counsel in tribal 
court, and under the Bill of Rights, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
was honored in federal court when he was tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 
 
72.  Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369 (1979). 
73.  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 749 (1994). 
74.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1965 (citing Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748-49). 
75.  Id. (quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747). 
76.  Id. (quoting United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008)). 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. at 1959. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1962. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. at 1962-63. 
83.  Id.. at 1965. 
         
260 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 251 
117(a).84  “Because a defendant convicted in tribal court suffers no Sixth 
Amendment violation in the first instance, ‘[u]se of tribal convictions in a 
subsequent prosecution cannot violate [the Sixth Amendment] “anew.”‘“85 
3. ICRA: “Need Merely Afford the Opportunity to  Obtain 
Counsel” 
It is important to note that when the ICRA was passed, it “limited 
sentences in tribal court to a maximum of one year’s imprisonment.”86  
While Congress has since expanded tribal courts’ sentencing authority to 
“impose up to three years’ imprisonment, contingent on adoption of 
additional procedural safeguards[,]” very few tribes have adopted these 
additional procedures.87  This essentially means that the protections 
regarding appointed counsel afforded to indigent defendants under the 
ICRA are moot.  It is because of this that no matter what crime a defendant 
commits, if the case is heard before a tribal court, it is highly unlikely that 
the tribal court would be able to implement a sentence greater than one 
years’ imprisonment.  Because the ICRA states that a defendant need 
merely be afforded the opportunity to obtain counsel for less than a year’s 
imprisonment, and most tribal courts only have the authority to impose 
sentences of up to one year’s imprisonment, indigent Native American 
defendants are not provided the right to counsel for crimes committed on 
tribal lands.88 
Bryant’s previous prison sentences, including those for domestic 
assault convictions, were less than one-year.89  These short sentences meant 
that Bryant did not have the right to appointed counsel.90  However, 
because ICRA requirements do not mandate appointed counsel for 
sentences one year or shorter, these tribal court proceedings complied with 
the ICR,A and thus, were valid.91 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, relying on 
Nichols to reason that using ICRA-compliant, uncounseled, tribal court 
convictions as predicate offenses for federal 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) 
prosecutions did not invalidate previously valid convictions.92  The 
 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 1966 (quoting U.S. v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
86.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960. 
87.  Id. (emphasis added). 
88.  Id. at 1960. 
89.  Id. at 1963. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1966. 
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Supreme Court, relying on precedent, “resist[ed] creating a ‘hybrid’ 
category of tribal-court convictions, ‘good for the punishment actually 
imposed but not available for sentence enhancement in a later 
prosecution.’”93 
B. THE CONCURRING OPINION 
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas explained that he joined the 
majority based on precedent, although he was concerned about how far the 
Court’s Sixth Amendment and Indian-law precedent has gone.94  Justice 
Thomas expressed additional concerns over the idea that Congress has 
unlimited power over all Indian affairs.  These concerns stemmed from 
Justice Thomas’ view that Congress’ plenary power over Indian affairs was 
not a right granted in the Constitution, but was instead created by Court 
precedent.95 
1. Existing Precedent: Where Does It Leave Our Legal  System? 
As previously described, in his concurring opinion Justice Thomas 
raised the issue of how “far afield our Sixth Amendment and Indian-law 
precedents have gone.”96  Justice Thomas raised doubts regarding the three 
basic assumptions that underlie Bryant: (1) that the Sixth Amendment 
ordinarily bars using convictions obtained in violation of a defendant’s right 
to counsel; (2) that tribes’ retained sovereignty entitles them to prosecute 
tribal members without being subject to the United States Constitution; and 
(3) that Congress can punish tribal members for assault that they commit 
against each other on tribal land.97  While Supreme Court precedent has 
endorsed all of these assumptions, Justice Thomas suggests that the Court 
has “never identified a sound constitutional basis for any of them” and he 
cannot identify one.98 
No enumerated power gives Congress plenary power over Native 
American tribes.99  There is nothing in Congress’ power to regulate 
commerce with tribes or in the Senate’s role to approve treaties with the 
tribes that even begins to suggest that there is such a sweeping power.100  In 
his concurrence, Justice Thomas suggested that the Court created this power 
 
93.  Id. (quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 744 (1994)). 
94.  Id. at 1967. 
95.  Id. at 1968-69. 
96.  Id. at 1967. 
97.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1967. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. at 1968. 
100.  Id. 
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for Congress when it was unable to find an enumerated power to justify a 
the Major Crimes Act,101 suggesting that it was for the tribes’ protection.102  
Despite such a weak foundation for this precedent, Congress’ unfettered 
power over tribes continues despite the Court’s inability to find any “valid 
constitutional justification” for the power.103 
2. Unintended Consequences: Should Precedent Be  Reconsidered? 
Congress’ plenary power over the tribes was not the only Supreme 
Court decision that Justice Thomas critiqued.104  Justice Thomas also 
suggested that “the Court was likely wrong in Burgett” when it created the 
“exclusionary rule” and would be open to reconsidering Burgett in the 
future.105  The Burgett exclusionary rule prohibits the government from 
using prior convictions obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment in 
subsequent proceedings.106  Unfortunately, Justice Thomas did not provide 
further clarification as to what portions of Burgett’s exclusionary rule 
should be reconsidered.107 
The concurrence then goes on to weigh “the central tension within our 
Indian-law jurisprudence.”108  On one hand, precedent states that tribes 
have a sovereignty that pre-exists the Constitution and need not comply 
with the same rules and regulations that govern federal and state 
authority.109  On the other hand, precedent has also “endowed Congress 
with an ‘all-encompassing’ power over all aspects of tribal sovereignty.”110  
Furthermore, Congress has continually treated all tribes as “possessing an 
identical quantum of sovereignty,” completely ignoring the various origins, 
treaties, and changes within the cultures of the distinct tribes.111 
IV. IMPACT 
National domestic abuse trends for Native Americans hold true in 
North Dakota, with Native Americans comprising fourteen percent of 
 
101.  The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, allowed Congress, for the first time in 
history, to punish crimes committed by Native Americans against Native Americans on tribal 
land.  18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2016). 
102.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1968. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. at 1967. 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1967. 
109.  Id. (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)). 
110.  Id. at 1968. 
111.  Id. 
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reported sexual assaults, but only 5.5% of the population.112  Nearly twenty-
five percent of family violence and seventy percent of other crimes against 
Native Americans involve a non-Indian perpetrator: a rate drastically higher 
than other groups.113  While these statistics are disheartening, the North 
Dakota bar has the ability to improve this situation. 
A. WHAT DOES “THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THEM” 
MEAN FOR NORTH DAKOTA? 
Even for attorneys with no intention of practicing law on tribal land, 
the large Native American population in North Dakota means that, at some 
point, almost every North Dakota attorney will have some dealings with 
tribal law.  In December 2015, roughly 5.5% of the population considered 
themselves Native American.114  Comparatively, Native Americans 
comprise just under one percent of the United States’ population.115  North 
Dakota is one of only five states with a Native American population above 
five percent, and contains all, or part of, five federal reservations within its 
borders.116 
The North Dakota United States Attorney’s Office (“the USA’s 
Office”) is responsible for prosecuting all violent crimes that occur on these 
reservations.117  While sexual assault is listed as a violent crime prosecuted 
by the USA’s Office, simple domestic assault is not.118  Limitations to the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, allow many 
perpetrators to evade felony charges unless they cause “substantial bodily 
injury. . . .”119  Satisfying this level of injury is difficult, requiring 
“‘temporary but substantial disfigurement’ or ‘temporary but substantial 
 
112.  ND COUNSEL ON ABUSED WOMEN’S SERVICES & N.D. DEP’T OF HEALTH, North 
Dakota Intimate Partner & Sexual Violence Prevention Plan (March 2010), 
https://www.ndhealth.gov/injury/publications/ND%20State%20Prevention%20Plan-2010-
March%20FINAL.pdf 
113.  FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, The Facts on Violence Against American 
Indian/Alaskan Native Women, https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Violence% 
20Against%20AI%20AN%20Women%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf (citing Greenfeld & Smith, 
American Indians and Crime, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Feb. 1999), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/aic.pdf.). 
114.  Indian Country, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFF. – DISTRICT OF N.D., 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-nd/indian-country (last updated Oct. 28, 2015). 
115.  Joe Cicha, Growing ND by the Numbers, N.D. CENSUS OFF. (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.commerce.nd.gov/uploads/8/CensusNewsletterDec2015.pdf. 
116.  Id.; Indian Country, supra note 114. 
117.  Indian Country, supra note 114. 
118.  Id. 
119.  United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1961 n.5 (2016) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
113(a)(7) (2013)). 
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loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member, organ, or mental 
faculty.’”120 
Such a high injury requirement means that many domestic assault 
cases, if reported, do not meet the federal requirements, and thus, are tried 
in tribal court.  Because the ICRA does not require the appointment of 
counsel for less than one year’s imprisonment, defendants in these tribal 
cases must find their own counsel.121  With unemployment and poverty 
continuing to be an issue in tribes throughout the State, many defendants 
find themselves unable to afford representation.122  If they were facing 
imprisonment in any other court system, these defendants would be 
guaranteed representation.123  Were these defendants non-Native 
Americans, they would have a guaranteed right to counsel while facing 
imprisonment, even in tribal court.124 
B. CATCH 22: HOW DOES NORTH DAKOTA PROTECT THE  PEOPLE IT 
DOES NOT GOVERN BECAUSE THEY CANNOT  PROTECT 
THEMSELVES? 
The holding in United States v. Bryant, will require North Dakota to 
take notice of the complex system that governs the reservations within its 
borders and ask how it can protect one of its most vulnerable classes, even 
if such action is outside the judicial system.  The ICRA allows a tribal court 
to impose a maximum one-year or $5000 sentence per crime in tribal 
court.125  The maximum three years’ imprisonment and $15,000 fine are 
imposed only for select crimes.126  Only tribes that accept the additional 
federal safeguards and procedures of the Tribal Law & Order Act of 2010, 
such as guaranteeing the right to counsel for sentences longer than one year, 
have the ability to impose these maximum penalties.127  Most tribes, 
however, have not done so.128  This means that unless the defendant is 
charged under the federal habitual offender statute, most domestic assault 
convictions will result in, at most, one year in prison.129  However, for 
 
120.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1)(A)(B)). 
121.  Id. at 1962 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6) (2010)). 
122.  Cicha, supra note 115. 
123.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961-62. 
124.  Id. at 1960 n.4 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d) (2016)). 
125.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B). 
126.  25 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1), (2). 
127.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(C), (c) (2016)). 
128.  Id. 
129.  Id. 
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habitual offender statutes to be utilized, predicate offenses must be 
reported.130  In this requirement, a major issue lies. 
The underreporting of domestic violence on tribal lands is well 
documented.131  Underreporting could have numerous causes, including 
difficulties in finding shelters or safe places to go after leaving abusive 
situations, limitations on police and healthcare services on reservations, and 
feelings of pointlessness in reporting.132  While defendants’ due process 
rights are important, it is at least equally important to ensure the safety of 
our fellow citizens.  The drastic differences in lives within North Dakota’s 
borders are highlighted by the statistics showing Native American women 
face a one in three chance of being sexually assaulted in their lifetimes, 
compared to a one in five chance for Caucasian women.133 
North Dakota is in a unique position to lead the change against 
domestic violence on reservations within our State.  Both the Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe and the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold 
Reservation have adopted sentencing guidelines that are close to the Tribal 
Law & Order Act of 2010, which will provide their tribal courts with more 
sentencing authority.134  This shows the tribes’ desire to protect those that 
are unable to protect themselves.  North Dakota could further build on this 
by establishing pro bono or reduced-rate legal networks specifically for 
those on tribal lands.  These affordable sources of legal assistance would 
help to ensure that tribes can afford to provide defendants with the legal 
services required for increased sentences.  Once increased sentences are 
imposed for crimes that currently receive less than one year’s 
imprisonment, victims of abuse may feel safer and more secure, potentially 
leading to more frequent reporting of assaults.  By simply volunteering their 
time and knowledge, members of the North Dakota bar could ensure that 
Native American defendants in tribal court receive adequate legal counsel, 
that convicted defendants are justly punished for their crimes, and that 
victims can feel safer and more willing to come forward. 
 
130.  Id. at 1961. 
131.  See Kathy Dobie, Tiny Little Laws, HARPER’S MAG. (Feb. 2011), http://indianlaw.org/ 
sites/default/files/HarpersMagazine-2011-02-0083300%5B1%5D.pdf; see also Dave Kolpack, 
Rulings Could Bring Crackdown on Domestic Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2011/12/12/rulings_could_bring_crackdown_on_d
omestic_violence/. 
132.  Michelle Rivard Parks, 2012 Tribal Victim Safety Roundtable: Responding to Sexual 
Violence Against Native Victims, TRIBAL JUD. INST. (2012), https://law.und.edu/tji-old/ 
_files/docs/2012-tvs-exec-summary.pdf. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1960 (citing Violence Against Women Act Implementation Chart, 
TRIB. L. & POL’Y INST., http://www.tribal-institute.org/download/VAWA/VAWAImplementation 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In United States v. Bryant, the United States Supreme Court overturned 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling that prior convictions in tribal 
court could not be used as predicate offenses for federal enhancement 
statutes.135  The Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment does not apply in 
tribal court proceedings and Bryant’s uncounseled, tribal court convictions 
were valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.136  After discussing 
requirements for appointed counsel in state and federal criminal 
proceedings, the Court upheld precedent allowing valid, uncounseled 
convictions to be used as predicate offenses for enhancement statutes.137  
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal courts; 
thus, defendants prosecuted in federal court based on tribal court 
convictions cannot “suffer anew” when these convictions are used as 
predicate offenses.138 
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